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THE PARADOXICAL GENESIS OF TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL 
 
Thomas S. Umlauft* 
 
Abstract 
 
At least since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, the problem of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) has 
received widespread attention. The research conducted in this context has, however, generally focused 
on the econometric aspect and the contribution of the TBTF doctrine to the financial crisis of 2007-
2009, while the economic historical approach has been confined to tracing the doctrine to its first 
appearance. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the academic literature by offering an explanation 
for why, as opposed to how, the TBTF doctrine has developed. This paper identifies the US 
population’s distrust and at times hostility against the prospect of concentration of power in large 
financial institutions as the causal factor leading to the TBTF phenomenon. The resulting socially non-
optimal regulation favoured a fragmented and fragile banking system based on small unit banks at the 
cost of more diversified branch banks. The Great Depression impressively highlighted the deep 
structural flaws of the US banking system. At the same time, however, it caused a shift in the public 
opinion, which had generally been opposed to deposit insurance, and thereby aligned the public 
interest with that of small banks, which would profit most from deposit insurance. The newly acquired 
public and political support enabled weak unit banks to lobby successfully against reforming the 
banking structure and instead for the adaption of federal deposit insurance. However, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) only addressed the symptoms of the weak banking industry but 
not its causes. Moreover, the strongly biased FDIC policies have generally favoured creditors at large 
banks, which ultimately led to the TBTF doctrine which, in turn, provided banks with a non-technical 
incentive to grow in size in order to gain TBTF protection. Initially aimed at preserving the US 
financial landscape based on small unit banks, the FDIC as the main conduit for TBTF rescues thus 
became the main driver for big bank corporate welfare. Deposit insurance gave rise to TBTF and, at the 
same time, put small banks deemed “too-small-to-safe” at a competitive disadvantage, further 
accelerating the trend towards increasingly large and complex banks. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 is closely 
connected to the failure of large banks which, owing 
to their size, were deemed to be too-big-to-fail 
(TBTF). Although smaller banks failed in large 
numbers as well, the causality is generally seen as 
running from large to smaller banks (Bair 2000; Boyd 
& Heitz 2012, p. 2; Slovik 2012, p. 9). Therefore, the 
interest in the too-big-to-fail problem in the wake of 
the Global Financial Crisis has grown dramatically 
and attracted a large number of studies. The studies 
undertaken have, however, mainly focused either on 
the econometric aspects, i.e. quantifying TBTF 
subsidies (Baker & McArthur 2009; Haldane 2010; 
Noss & Sowerbutts 2012; Ueda & Weder di Mauro 
2012), or the contribution of the TBTF doctrine to the 
Global Financial Crisis (see, for example, Boyd, 
Jagannathan & Kwak 2009, Umlauft 2014). 
Historical approaches have usually concentrated on 
the development of the TBTF doctrine per se, that is 
the development from its first appearance, but not its 
underlying causes (see, for example, Shull 2010). 
This paper therefore attempts to fill this gap in the 
academic literature by addressing the question why, 
as opposed to how, TBTF has developed.  
The paper in hand shows that the underlying factors 
that have led to the TBTF doctrine are rooted in the 
historical development of the United States, whose 
population as well as politicians have traditionally 
exhibited a marked distrust and at times hostility 
against the prospective of concentrated power in large 
financial institutions. This distrust, combined with the 
opportunities it offered for banking institutions to 
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lobby for favourable legislation, significantly shaped 
banking sector regulation. As a result, the regulation 
of the financial system allowed for a fragmented 
banking system, predominantly based on small, 
single-unit banks, prone to financial crises. The Great 
Depression impressively highlighted the deep 
structural flaws of the US banking system. Yet, the 
response to the large number of bank runs and 
banking panics during 1929-1933 was not so much a 
reformation of the dysfunctional system but rather 
addressing its symptoms (bank runs, banking panics, 
bank failures) by introducing federal deposit 
insurance in 1933. Insurance of deposits by the 
government, however, aggravated the structural 
problems by subsidising banks’ risk-taking. 
Therefore, the establishment of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) not only did not 
address the underlying structural problems of the US 
banking system but also increased its fragility by 
subsidising risky behaviour. Beginning in the 1970s, 
the FDIC’s approach to the resolution of the 
increasing number of bank failures became 
successively more biased – while small banks 
generally were liquidated protecting depositors only 
within the insurance limit, large bank resolutions 
usually protected creditors and depositors in full. 
Insofar as the FDIC encouraged risky behaviour of 
banks and constitutes the main conduit through which 
TBTF measures have been undertaken,14 federal 
deposit insurance both precipitated and made possible 
TBTF.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows: Part 2 will discuss the methodological 
framework used in order to answer the research 
question and give a short review of the related 
theoretical literature. Finally, the applied techniques 
as well as the sources and data used will be discussed. 
Part 3 will present a narrative analysis of the problem 
by briefly reviewing the evolution of the US financial 
system with regard to important developments 
connected with the research question. Part 4 will 
provide a conclusion, summarising the main findings 
in this paper and their implications and offering 
policy recommendations directly derived from these.  
 
2 Methodology & Review of Theoretical 
Literature 
 
The paper draws heavily on the theory of regulation. 
Until the middle of the 20th century, regulation had 
primarily been explained by the public interest 
theory, which holds that regulation results from the 
demand of the public and is aimed at correcting 
failures and inequities of unregulated, laissez-faire 
markets. Therefore, governments were seen to be 
both capable of and willing to efficiently eliminate 
                                                          
14
 Sprague (2000) gives a detailed account of the early 
history of too-big-to-fail bailouts, highlighting the leading 
part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 
TBTF rescues. 
market failures and thereby raise social welfare. As 
Posner (1974) notes, the public interest theory had 
mostly been implicitly assumed rather than 
articulated. The economic theory of regulation, first 
advocated by Stigler (1971) and Posner (1974), 
provides an economic rationale for regulation by 
arguing “that regulation is supplied in response to the 
demands of interest groups struggling among 
themselves to maximize the incomes of their 
members.“ (Posner 1974, p. 335-336) The economic 
theory of regulation is based on Olson’s (1965) 
theory of “Collective Action” which posits that the 
smaller the group and the higher its per capita stake at 
the outcome, the more likely it will succeed in 
influencing regulation. Accordingly, the supply of 
regulation is administered by the same factor as other 
goods: demand. Since industries are directly affected 
by (costly) regulation they have a larger stake at 
favourable outcomes than the widely dispersed 
public. Because industry groups possess greater 
resources, they often succeed in instrumentalising the 
state’s coercive power in order to assure favourable 
regulation at the cost of the public or less influential 
industries. Insofar as interest groups often succeed in 
influencing regulators to enact favourable regulation 
to maximise their profits by acquiring economic 
rents, the economic theory of regulation is often 
referred to as capture theory. Laffont & Tirole (1991) 
supplement Stigler and Posner’s framework by 
enhancing the theory from a theory focused on the 
demand side by providing a supply side aspect. 
Laffont & Tirole thereby significantly increase the 
theory’s credence as well as its explanatory power. 
The authors allow for agency problems15 that 
manifest themselves in favourable regulation owing 
to benefits for regulators by regulated firms. 
According to Laffont & Tirole, decision-makers may 
be captured by interest groups with monetary bribes, 
revolving doors between regulating agencies and the 
industry and personal relationships as well as political 
contributions.  
A different strand of academic literature 
critiques the economic theory of regulation for 
focusing on self-interest alone and rejects it as too 
narrow. Specifically, it is argued that ideology and 
altruism may play an important role in legislation. On 
a purely logical level, Kau & Rubin (1979) present a 
convincing case by pointing out that economists, 
more than any other group of social scientists, are 
more likely to reject government intervention in 
favour of free markets. Yet, the authors continue, if 
such policies were to be adopted, the income of 
economists would fall, since the government 
constitutes a significant demand factor for 
economists. Thus, Kau & Rubin conclude, 
                                                          
15
 Principle-agent relationships arise when principals (e.g. 
owners, electorate) delegate powers to agents (e.g. 
managers, politicians) in order for the latter to act in the 
interest of the former. Agency problems are the result of 
discrepant interests of the two parties and denominate 
actions which benefit agents at the cost of principals.   
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economists advocate a policy on ideological grounds, 
detrimental to their self-interest. Moreover, the 
authors argue that economists seem to implicitly 
accept the notion that ideology does matter with 
regard to legislation as most articles in the field of 
economics offer some sort of policy advice. Clearly, 
the raison d’être of advice is predicated on the 
influence of ideas.16 In subsequent research, ideology 
is found to be a dominant factor in explaining voting 
behaviour related to minimum wages in the United 
States (Kau & Rubin 1978) and on coal mining laws 
(Kalt & Zupan 1984). Goldstein (1988) finds similar 
evidence related to protectionist US trade policies 
where redistributive motives seem to have played an 
important role, and Berglöf & Rosenthal (2000, 2003) 
suggest that ideology is a key determinant for 
explaining voting patterns on US bankruptcy 
legislation between 1800 and 1976. Ideology is also 
found to be a dominant factor in explaining regulation 
in the financial sector. Roe (1994), for example, 
argues that the population’s fear of concentration of 
power within financial firms substantially shaped 
banking regulation in the United States. Similar 
interpretations can be found in Viner (1936) who 
argues that the fear of Wall Street and financial 
conglomerates shaped policy-making in a variety of 
ways.  
Finally, somewhat related to both the economic 
theory of regulation and regulation based on ideology 
is what Buiter (2008, p. 106) calls “cognitive 
regulatory capture”, which is  
“not achieved by special interest buying, black-
mailing or bribing their way towards control of the 
legislature, the executive […] or some other 
important regulator or agency […] but instead 
through those in charge of the relevant state entity 
internalising, as if by osmosis, the objectives, 
interests and perception of reality of the vested 
interest they are meant to regulate and supervise in 
the public interest.” 
However, the explicit models in the above cited 
articles, with the notable exception of Buiter (2008), 
who uses the concept in a qualitative way, all suffer 
from the common weakness of monocausal 
explanations. Given that measuring ideology is a 
complicated if not impossible task, models that link 
voting behaviour to some form of measurement of 
ideology are of limited use only. The same, of course, 
is true for economic incentives whose measurement is 
equally problematic, given that many of the factors 
put forth by Laffont & Tirole (1991) in order to 
explain voting behaviour – bribes, future employment 
prospects, personal relationships, etc. – are strictly 
not observable due to them being either illegal or 
potentially damaging for politicians’ reputation. 
                                                          
16
 However, a case could be made in favour of rationally 
acting economists insofar as policy advices may be 
aimed at incentivising disadvantaged groups so that they 
organise and thereby provide a counter-measure for 
influential, concentrated interest groups. 
Moreover, there probably is some overlap of the 
vested interests’ of lobbying groups and captured 
politicians due to humans’ tendency to morally justify 
one’s behaviour. The task of measuring either 
function is further complicated by the observed 
phenomena of shirking17 (see Rowley & Schneider 
2004, p. 293-294 for an overview) and log-rolling18 
(Irwin & Kroszner 1999). Finally, Poole & Rosenthal 
(1994) stress the difficulties resulting from party 
discipline-influenced voting behaviour.  
These problems render monocausal explanations not 
a particularly promising approach for a positive 
analysis of history. Although the above mentioned 
models provide the conceptual framework for the 
analysis conducted in this paper, a narrative approach 
will be applied in order to fully account for the 
various factors at work – ideology, private interests as 
well as cognitive regulatory capture – and in 
particular their intertwined occurrences. The paper 
therefore draws on econometric studies, narrative 
analyses and official releases as well as contemporary 
accounts.  
In view of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and 
subsequent efforts to reform the financial sector (e.c. 
Dodd-Frank Act, Basel III), historical bank regulation 
in the United States offers a particularly promising 
field for demonstrating how ideology and private 
interests may interact and lead to inefficient outcomes 
that benefit a small group at the expense of more 
widely dispersed groups and ultimately the economy.  
 
3 Descriptive Analysis 
 
Banks play a vital role in any economy due to their 
primary purpose of channelling funds from surplus 
units to those with deficits. In other words, banks and 
other financial intermediaries make sure that the 
resource money does not lie idle but instead is 
directed toward a constructive use. As distress in the 
banking sector is generally associated with severe 
output losses (Friedman & Schwartz 1993 [1963], 
Bernanke 1983; Boyd, Kwak & Smith 2005), banks 
and other financial intermediaries are heavily 
regulated in most countries (Allen & Gale 2001). 
Compared to other countries, the US financial system 
is special on many accounts. The two most important 
characteristics that historically (have) defined the US 
banking sector are (1) the dual banking system19 and 
                                                          
17
 Shirking constitutes a principal-agent problem and arises 
when politicians’ voting behaviour does not represent the 
ideology of their electorate but instead the politicians’ 
own views.  
18
 Log-rolling occurs when groups with unconnected interests 
form supportive voting coalitions in order to obtain 
favoured legislations.  
19
 The dual banking system describes the United States’ 
bank chartering both under state and federal law. While 
banks chartered under state law (state banks) are 
supervised by the respective state legislature, federally 
chartered banks (national banks) are supervised and 
regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC). 
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(2) unit banking20. Both characteristics are unique to 
the United States21 and will be outlined in the 
following two chapters. 
 
Dual Banking 
 
The dual banking system is rooted in the Unites 
States Constitutional Convention in 1787, when 
federalist and anti-federalists22 debated over whether 
the power to regulate the financial sector should 
belong to the states or the federal government. In 
1791 the federalists seemed to have won the day by 
establishing the federally chartered First Bank of the 
United States (BUS1), which acted as a quasi-central 
bank by systematically converting banknotes from 
state banks and thereby preventing over-issuing.23 In 
addition to that, its chartering was also intended to 
ensure government funding. However, the BUS1 
charter was not renewed in 1811 which left a void 
that was filled by small state-chartered banks which 
rapidly increased after the dissolution of the BUS1. 
From 1811 to 1816, the number of state banks 
increased from 90 to 260, while the outstanding value 
of banknotes rose from $28 million to $68 million. 
The resulting over-banking after 1811 combined with 
the war against England forced wide areas of the US 
banking system to suspend convertibility of 
banknotes into species. The disastrous banking 
situation convinced many former opponents of 
federally chartered banks to charter the Second Bank 
of the United States (BUS2) in 1816 (Myers 1970, p. 
78-84). Jenkins & Weidenmier (1999) show that 
voting behaviour on BUS2 is explained by 
ideological as well as economic factors. On the one 
hand, beliefs about how much power the federal 
government should have in relation to state 
governments constituted a divide. This ideological 
motive in turn was often shaped by economic interest 
of the states as state bank revenues provided a 
significant portion of state revenues (Sylla, Legler & 
Wallis 1978; Jenkins & Weidenmier 1999).  
Again, the disciplining presence of the BUS2 
prevented state banks from imprudent note issuance, 
and again, after the charter expired in 1836, it was not 
extended, this time due to a veto by President 
                                                          
20
 Unit banks are comprised of only one office and no 
branches. 
21
 See Federal Reserve System (1924: 929); Calomiris & 
White (1994, p. 148). 
22
 The terms federalism and anti-federalism in the United 
States have repeatedly undergone a change in meaning. 
Although today federalism generally denotes the strive 
for strong regional administrations as opposed to the 
central government, in the context of this paper, 
federalism will be used in its historical meaning to 
describe proponents of a strong central (federal) 
government.  
23
 The Federal Reserve System (Fed), the United States’ 
central bank, was only established in 1913 under the 
impression of the Crash of 1907. Over-issuing of bank 
notes had been a continuous problem until 1863 when a 
uniform currency was introduced. Until then, note issuing 
powers had belonged to banks. 
Jackson, a well-known opponent of banks in 
general.24 With the power to regulate banks back 
solely in the hands of the states, 1837 marks the 
beginning of the so-called free banking era, which by 
many is seen as a response to the concentration of 
power. In free banking systems, states lost their 
discretionary chartering privilege in favour of a 
specified set of rules whose satisfaction automatically 
granted a bank charter. Some researchers attribute the 
move towards free banking to a democratisation of 
banking which was aimed at stripping governments of 
their often misused power of chartering towards a 
more rule-based and objective approach (Bodenhorn 
2006). Others see free banking merely as a 
consequence of decreased charter values which made 
discretionary chartering by governments not 
worthwhile anymore (Grossman 2010, p. 230).   
The Civil War (1861-1865) provided the federal 
government with the opportunity to reform the 
banking and financial system because the southern 
states, which had traditionally been opposing federal 
regulation, had withdrawn from Congress (Komai & 
Richardson 2011, p. 3).25 A crucial factor for 
understanding the reformation of the banking sector 
was the federal government’s need for funding in 
order to finance its war efforts. The National Banking 
Act of 1863, which was modified the following year 
by the National Banking Act of 1864,26 finally 
brought the federal government into banking by 
establishing federally chartered national banks as an 
alternative to state banks. Except for the short periods 
between 1791 and 1811 and between 1816 and 1836, 
when the First and the Second Bank of the United 
States operated under a federal charter, this was the 
first time that banks from different states would 
operate under a uniform charter, regulation and 
supervision. In 1862, Congress had granted national 
banks a quasi-monopoly on the issue of banknotes by 
levying a 2% tax on banknotes issued by state banks. 
To further encourage bank chartering under federal 
law, the Revenue Act of 1965 increased the tax to 
10%, which ultimately rendered the issuance of notes 
by state banks unprofitable (Myers 1970, p. 163; 
Committee on Branch, Group, and Chain Banking 
1932, p. 61). As banknotes issued by national banks 
were required to be backed by US government bonds, 
a much needed demand for government debt was 
                                                          
24
 For a historical account of both the First and the Second 
Bank of the United States, see Holdsworth & Dewey 
(1910) and Myers (1970, p. 66-94). 
25
 In fact, opposition to federal government, mainly from the 
western and southern states, had prevented the United 
States from establishing a central bank, a uniform 
currency and nationwide bank regulation. Besides 
establishing national banks, the National Banking Act 
also introduced a uniform currency backed by the United 
States’ Treasury (Komai & Richardson (2011, p. 3-4). 
26
 The National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 initially were 
called National Currency Acts of 1863 and 1864 because 
besides creating the national banking system the 
legislation introduced a uniform national currency backed 
by US bonds and the US government. 
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created that would help finance the war efforts of the 
government (Myers 1970, p. 163). However, state 
banks did not disappear and in fact flourished from 
the 1880s onwards. Spong (2000, p. 19) attributes this 
trend to two factors: First, the importance of 
banknotes decreased significantly vis-à-vis deposits 
in the second half of the 19th century, stripping 
national banks from one of their main advantages 
over state banks (Around the middle of the 19th 
century the ratio of deposits to banknotes had been 
about 1:1. However, by 1870, the ratio had increased 
to 2:1 and by the end of the century to 7:1 (FDIC 
1998: 12; Golembe & Warburton 1958: I-2)). Second, 
the yields on government debt eligible for note 
backing began to fall in the 1880s and continued to 
do so until the end of the century (A time-series 
analysis of Homer & Sylla (2005, p. 283-285) of US 
government yields indicates that yields on US 
government debt had been decreasing since the 
1860s). Another factor for the continuing importance 
of state banks may well have been the prohibition of 
branch banking for national banks. Since certain 
states allowed branching for state banks, this 
constituted a major advantage for state banks as the 
Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 prescribed unit 
banking for national banks (Myers 1970, p. 165) (The 
National Banking Act of 1864 dropped the plural of 
“office” as used in the Act of 1863 (Myers 1970, p. 
165). Insofar as “branching” had not been used in the 
Act of 1864 (Committee on Branch, Group, and 
Chain Banking 1932, p. 51), the revision most likely 
aimed at eliminating an ambiguous passage).  
Summarising, with the notable exception of the 
First and the Second Bank of the United States, until 
1863 bank chartering, regulation and supervision was 
left in the hands of the states due to a struggle 
between federalists and anti-federalists. Only in 1863, 
facilitated by the Civil War, the federal government 
managed to assume a significant role in the banking 
industry. However, the newly created national banks 
did not succeed in supplanting state banks, leading to 
the co-existence of state and national banks 
henceforth (see figure 1 for the evolution of the 
number of state and national banks) and therefore to 
the dual banking system characteristic for the United 
States’ financial system.  
 
Figure 1. Number of National and State Banks, 1863-1928. Data: Comptroller of the Currency (1932, p. 3). 
 
 
 
3.1 Unit Banking 
 
 
A direct consequence of the United States’ dual 
banking system is its equally unique system of unit 
banking. Until recently, banks with only one office 
and no branches dominated the United States’ 
banking landscape.27 Calomiris & White (1994, p. 
                                                          
27
 Interstate branch banking was only introduced in 1994 
when the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
148) argue that one of the most important 
preconditions for bank fragmentation was the 
Supreme Court’s decision not to apply the commerce 
clause to banks.28 As a corollary, state 
                                                                                       
Efficiency Act of 1994 repealed the McFadden provision 
on interstate banking.  
28
 The commerce clause (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the 
U.S. Constitution) grants Congress the power “to 
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governments’authority to charter banks allowed 
individual states to design their own banking systems 
which systematically protected domestic banks by 
limiting competition. While this approach explains 
the absence of interstate banking, it does not explain 
the prohibition of intrastate branch banking. 
However, White (1984, p. 1086-1089) links unit 
banking to populist propaganda of single office 
bankers to capture rents by effectively arousing fears 
of branch banking, and Calomiris (2000) regards 
farmers as beneficiaries of unit banking insofar as 
branching restrictions tied banks to specific locations 
and therefore secured loans for the agrarian 
population. Moreover, Bodenhorn (2003, p. 12-18) 
demonstrates that bank chartering by states often 
involved bribes and favours like government loans in 
exchange for charters. It is therefore conceivable that 
chartering a higher number of unit banks was 
perceived to be more profitable by politicians than 
chartering a significantly lower number of branch 
banks.  
The main advantages of branch banking have 
already been pointed out by Sprague (1903, p. 243): 
(1) superior ability of management, (2) decreased risk 
through the enhanced possibility of diversification of 
investments and (3) greater effectiveness of reserves. 
While the first point is based on the logic that larger 
firms are able to attract, both by their reputation and 
the possibility of paying higher salaries, more 
talented managers, the two other points are firmly 
rooted in both basic financial theory and 
mathematical proof.29 Consequently, Sprague (1903, 
p. 242) asserts that “[u]pon few subjects has the 
consensus of opinion of both economists and 
financial writers been more general than upon the 
advantages of branch banking over a systems of 
separate local banks.”  
Indeed, a wide range of scholars see unit 
banking as an important factor for banking system 
instability in the United States. Calomiris (2000) 
shows that systems with large, geographically 
diversified banks were less prone to panics, which 
had a lower failure probability and incurred smaller 
losses when they failed. Furthermore, systems with 
branch banking, while not immune to panics, 
recovered more quickly than unit banking systems 
ceteris paribus. Bordo (1985, p. 27) links the 
nationwide banking panics between 1870 and 1933 to 
the United States’ unit banking system “in a period 
when they were an historical curiosity in other 
countries.” Similar opinions can be found in White 
                                                                                       
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several states, and with the Indian tribes.” 
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_clause)  
29
 Bernoulli is generally credited for proving the law of large 
numbers, while the ground-braking work of Markowitz 
(1952) on portfolio selection demonstrated that 
diversification may decrease risk with no negative effect 
on return. However, the proverb that warns us from 
putting all eggs in one baskets suggests that the concept 
and benefits of diversification has been well-known for 
quite a while. 
(1984) who compares the US’ to the Canadian 
banking system which proved to be much more 
resilient to panics than the US system. 
The fragility of unit banking has long been 
recognised and a variety of measures were undertaken 
in order to stabilise the very same. Most notably, 
bank obligation insurance schemes have been adopted 
in two waves by individual states in order to protect 
the payment system from the disruptive effects of 
bank failures (Golembe 1960, p. 195; Calomiris & 
White, p. 148).30  
The first bank obligation insurance scheme was 
introduced in 1829 in New York.31 Under the New 
York “safety fund”, banks were required to pay an 
assessment into an insurance fund which would 
reimburse creditors of failed participating banks 
(Bodenhorn 1996).32 Vermont and Michigan soon 
adopted similar bank insurance schemes in 1831 and 
1836, respectively. Concurrent with this, Indiana 
introduced a bank insurance system in 1834, which 
made member banks mutually liable for the 
outstanding debt of other member banks. In order to 
limit risk-taking, supervision was assumed by bank 
directors whose interest was to prevent failures of 
other banks due to the shared liability. Mutual 
guarantee of bank obligations was also introduced 
1842 in Ohio and 1858 in Iowa. The bank obligation 
guarantee systems in Indiana, Ohio and Iowa all 
dissipated in 1866 when the prohibitive tax on 
banknotes issued by state banks forced state banks to 
convert to national banks, but no creditor had lost any 
money under these systems (Golembe 1955). The 
deposit insurance experiments of New York, Vermont 
and Michigan, on the other hand, all collapsed under 
the weight of bank failures. Uniform assessment fees 
not based on risk as well as the removal of market 
discipline had provided banks with ample 
opportunities to engage in unsound practices. Bank 
failures in these states therefore were frequently 
attributable to risky behaviour or outright fraud of 
insured banks (Golembe & Warburton 1958, 
Bodenhorn 1996, Garlock 1926).33  
The second wave of deposit insurance schemes 
was triggered by the panic of 1907. Between 1908 
and 1929, eight states introduced deposit insurance 
schemes, all of which were based on assessments paid 
into a fund (The second wave of bank insurance 
                                                          
30
 In addition to bank obligation insurance, multiple (most 
often double, but also triple and unlimited) liability for 
bank shareholders had been introduced in many states 
in order to limit bank risk-taking (Macey & Miller 1992). 
31
 Although bank obligation insurance ultimately prevailed, 
other options – branch banking and bond-backed note 
issue – had been discussed (Bodenhorn 1996, p. 22). 
32
 A detailed analysis of the New York “safety fund” can be 
found in Chaddock (1910) as well as in Golembe & 
Warburton (1958, ch. II). 
33
 For a detailed account on bank obligation insurance 
systems between 1829 and 1866 in general, see 
Golembe & Warburton (1958). Golembe (1955) and 
FDIC (1998: 3-12) provide a short overview of the six 
systems.  
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schemes only insured deposits because the Banking 
Act of 1863 had made banknotes secured by US 
Treasury bonds and convertible at face value into 
specie at the Treasury, therefore rendering insurance 
of banknotes unnecessary). As a consequence of 
implementing insurance systems that lacked an 
alignment of interests by subsidising risk-taking, all 
insurance funds failed in the 1920s, leaving creditors 
largely unprotected. Deposit insurance systems in the 
early 20th century had been adopted by states where 
state legislature had firmly established unit banking 
laws which had promoted a large number of small, 
undiversified banks. Therefore, deposit insurance was 
more likely to be adopted in states where small unit 
banks were dominant and hence where deposit 
insurance’s assumed effect of stabilising the banking 
sector was most needed due to the weak banking 
system. Thus adoption of deposit insurance was seen 
as a means of addressing the symptoms of weak unit 
banking systems (bank failures), without having to 
reform the banking system (Colomiris & White 1994, 
White 1981). However, while state deposit insurance 
systems did decrease the number of suspensions due 
to runs, failures due to mis-management and risk-
taking increased (Chung & Richardson 2006). 
Moreover, Dehejia & Lleras-Muney (2007) show that 
the expansion of the financial sector resulting from 
deposit insurance adversely affected economic 
growth, while increased banking activity induced by 
branching had positive effects on growth.  
Notwithstanding the widely recognised 
advantages of branch banking and the failure of bank 
obligation insurance to stabilise unit banking systems, 
by the end of the 19th century unit banking had been 
made the norm. This was facilitated by the 
prohibition of national banks to operate branches as 
prescribed by the National Banking Acts of 1863 and 
1864. In 1895, only four states therefore allowed 
branch banking (Grossman 2010, p. 238). The early 
20th century saw an increasing interest in branch 
banking, especially after the post-war agricultural 
depression, which had weakened many rural unit 
banks (White 1985, p. 1085). In the period from 1900 
to 1925, the number of branches rose from 119 to 
2,525 (Calomiris & White 1994, p. 151) as the 
number of states permitting some kind of branching 
more than doubled from less than ten to more than 20 
(Grossman 2010, p. 238). The development of the 
share of banks operating branches is depicted in 
figure 2 below, demonstrating the increase of 
branching activity of US banks, albeit at a 
continuingly marginal level (Cf. Committee on 
Branch, Group, and Chain Banking (1932, p. 6); 
Comptroller of the Currency (1931, p. 3)). 
 
Figure 2. Share of State & National Banks Operating Branches, 1863-1928 
 
 
 
Data: Committee on Branch, Group, and Chain Banking (1932, p. 6); Comptroller of the Currency (1931, p. 3) 
 
The trend towards more liberal branching 
legislation and the threat it posed to unit banks in the 
1920s motivated the latter to actively lobby against 
branch banking as they pushed the American Bankers 
Association to declare: 
“We regard branch banking or establishment of 
additional offices by banks as detrimental to the best 
interests of the people of the U.S. Branch banking is 
contrary to public policy, violates the basic principles 
of our government and concentrates the credits of the 
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nation and the power of money in the hands of a 
few.” (Economides, Hubbard & Palia 1995, p. 23) 
As can be seen, the typical stereotypes were 
used in an attempt to instrumentalise the public and 
politicians for the vested interest of unit banks. As a 
corollary, the trend towards more liberal branching in 
state legislature was counteracted by the McFadden 
Act in 1927, which prohibited branching and 
therefore codified the US unit banking system – or at 
least severely constrained branch banking – by 
explicitly interdicting interstate branching for 
federally-chartered banks, although it did allow 
intrastate banking for national banks to the extent 
permitted by state legislation within the city limits of 
parent institutions (Committee on Branch, Group, and 
Chain Banking 1932, p. 4). Not surprisingly, 
Economides, Hubbard & Palia (1995) provide 
statistical evidence that politicians from states with a 
large proportion of unit banks voted in favour of the 
McFadden Act and hence branching restrictions, 
indicating successful lobbying on the part of unit 
banks, concluding that the Act benefited small unit 
banks which would not have been able to compete 
with large branch banks without branching 
restrictions. 
 
3.2 The Great Depression 
 
The 1920s and the Great Depression highlighted the 
deep structural flaws of the US banking system. From 
the beginning of the 1920s to 1933, the total number 
of banks in the US fell from almost 30,000 to less 
than 14,000 (Upham & Lamke 1934, p. 247). The 
seminal work “A Monetary History of the United 
States” by Friedman & Schwartz (1993 [1963)] 
stresses that bank failures during the Great 
Depression resulted from panics, in which depositors 
withdraw money indiscriminately and therefore 
regardless of banks’ fundamentals. The authors 
therefore conclude that the large number of bank 
failures were due to liquidity, not solvency issues and 
the failures need not have happened if the Federal 
Reserve had provided liquidity support for distressed 
banks. As deposit insurance, similar to the lender of 
last resort function of central banks, can be seen as a 
liquidity insurance, even Friedman (1960, p. 21), 
whose attitude towards government intervention 
usually is not as favourable, praises “deposit 
insurance [as] the most important structural change in 
our monetary system in the direction of greater 
stability since the post-Civil War tax on state bank 
notes”.  
The notion that a lack of liquidity stood at the 
core of the banking panics during 1929-1933 was 
shared by many contemporary politicians and policy-
makers. If liquidity were to blame for the Great 
Depression failures, then, indeed, a strong case could 
be made for deposit insurance. Federally insured 
deposits would make deposits less likely to be 
withdrawn in times of crises and therefore would 
forestall “contagion” and a domino effect during 
which solvent but illiquid banks would fail.34  
However, more recent research suggests that 
contagion was not an important factor for the high 
number of bank failures during the Great Depression.  
In contrast to Friedman & Schwartz (1993 [1963]), 
Wicker (2000) finds that the Great Depression panics 
were mostly regionally confined and hence no nation-
wide phenomena. Wicker confirms the four banking 
panics identified by Friedman & Schwartz between 
1930 and 1933, although with slight modifications 
regarding their exact dates, and finds a fifth “mini 
panic” confined to the city of Chicago. Unlike 
Friedman & Schwartz, Wicker employs 
disaggregated data using Federal Reserve District 
data of Federal Reserve Notes in circulation as a 
proxy for depositor confidence in the banking system. 
Complementary, Wicker attempts a micro-history of 
the areas most affected by the banking panics.35 
According to Wicker, the banking panics constituted 
separation equilibria, not pooling equilibria, in as 
much as panics were confined to specific regions and 
bank runs were directed towards specific banks which 
were known to be weak. 
The first panic from November 1930 to January 
1931 was concentrated to the South and targeted 
banks which were known to be in some business 
relationship with Caldwell and Company in 
Nashville, Tennessee, the largest investment bank in 
the South. Wicker provides evidence that three of the 
four banking panics constituted separation equilibria. 
That is, panics were confined to specific banks which 
had problems or were insolvent. The first panic from 
November 1930 to January 1931 was concentrated to 
the South and targeted banks which were known to be 
in some business relationship with Caldwell and 
Company in Nashville Tennessee, the largest 
investment bank in the South which failed in 
November 1930. In contrast to Friedman & Schwartz, 
who identified the failure of the Bank of the United 
States as the initial and primary cause of the panic, 
Wicker emphasises the importance of the demise of 
Caldwell, which controlled the largest Southern chain 
of banks with assets above $200m as well as the 
largest insurance group of the South with assets of 
$230m. Therefore, “[t]he failure of Caldwell and 
Company had immediate repercussion in four states, 
namely Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas and North 
Carolina in the Atlanta, St. Louis, and Richmond 
Federal Reserve Districts.” (Wicker 2000, p. 33). 
Wicker points out that most bank failures during the 
first banking panic can be attributed to their 
                                                          
34
 Since long-term loans are not easily convertible into cash 
without incurring substantial losses to the bank, 
unwarranted withdrawals may render solvent but illiquid 
banks insolvent. In other words, perceived insolvency 
may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy insofar as an ex 
ante solvent banks may become insolvent due to forced 
liquidation.   
35
 Wicker (1996) – The Banking Panics of the Great 
Depression, p. 22. 
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relationship with Caldwell, indicating a separation 
equilibrium, not a pooling equilibrium. Wicker 
concludes: 
“The principal conclusion to emerge from our 
description and analysis of the accelerated bank 
suspensions in November 1930-January 1931 is that 
there was no national banking crisis. The banking 
difficulties were region specific, that is, of some local 
and regional concern but without national 
importance.” (Wicker 1996, p. 58) 
Although Wicker is unable to identify the initial 
shock of the second panic from April to August 1931, 
the subsequent two shocks are clearly attributable to 
Chicago in June and in Toledo in August. The second 
panic was thus region-specific as well and does not 
seem to have been motivated by irrational deposit 
withdrawals. Instead, the Chicago runs were 
concentrated on newly-chartered, small banks which 
had provided funds for real estate developers, again 
indicating a separation, not a pooling equilibrium. 
“From our examination of the second banking 
crisis we conclude that there was no geographically 
diffused nationwide banking crisis between April and 
August 1931. Banking suspensions were centered in a 
relatively few Federal Reserve Districts. The banking 
crisis was largely a region specific phenomenon; it 
had not yet become a full-fledged national crisis.” 
(Wicker 1996, p. 72) 
Similarly, bank failures during the third panic 
from September to October 1931 were confined to 
Chicago, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia and 
predominantly affected savings banks and trust 
companies in the periphery. Wicker (2000, p. 99) 
notes: 
“Our analysis would tend to suggest that the 
waves of bank suspensions in September – October 
do not appear to have conformed fully to the 
conventional view of a banking panic; that is, there 
was no indiscriminate run on banks by depositors 
whose confidence in banking institutions in a given 
area had been shattered. Bank runs, especially 
among urban banks, appear to have been directed 
against particular banks that were known to be 
weak.”  
Only the fourth panic from February to March 
1933 indicates some degree of pooling behaviour, as 
both solvent and insolvent, sound and unsound banks 
became subject to runs. The panic originated in 
Detroit due to the impeding collapse of the Guardian 
Group, which had been heavily exposed to real estate, 
as Michigan declared a bank holiday. According to 
Wicker (2000, p. 121) “[t]he declaration of the 
Michigan holiday spread fear and uncertainty quickly 
to the contiguous states who promptly placed 
restrictions on deposit withdrawals.” Subsequent 
bank moratoria in 48 states “brought banking 
operations to a virtual standstill.” (Wicker 2000, p. 
148) Hence, Wicker identifies the attempt to forestall 
panic and contagion as the primary factor causing the 
very same, which prompts Wicker (p. 48) to note that 
“[t]he banking panic of 1933 remains an anomaly 
among US financial panics.” 
Calomiris & Mason (2000) show that 
fundamentals explain most failures and therefore that 
contagion or liquidity played a relatively unimportant 
role in bank failures and banking panics of the Great 
Depression until 1933. Calomiris & Mason (1997) 
find that the characteristics of banks which failed in 
Chicago during the panic of 1932 were not different 
from those before the panic. Therefore, the failures 
during the panic of 1932 reflected the weakness of 
failing banks, while solvent banks generally 
withstood the panic. They find that contagion did not 
play a major role in the Chicago banking panic of 
1932. Similar findings are presented by White (1984) 
who demonstrates that US-wide bank failures during 
the 1930 panic were similar to those of the 1920s and 
not attributable to banking panics. Postel-Vinay 
(2013) analyses the banking system in Chicago 
during the years 1923-1933 and finds that, although 
banks seem to have suffered from indiscriminate 
runs, the ones which failed the earliest in the 1930s 
held a higher share of illiquid, risky assets. 
Instead of contagion, many scholars attribute the 
large number of bank failures during the Great 
Depression to the prevalent unit banking at that time 
and argue that, had branch banking been allowed, 
there would have been fewer failures (Bordo 1985, 
White 1984, Calomiris 2000). Wheelock (1993) 
provides empirical evidence that bank failure rates 
during the 1920s were closely correlated with excess 
capacity, or overbanking, as measured by banks per 
capita. The number of banks per capita, in turn, was 
highest in states that restricted branch banking. Cross-
sectional studies on bank failures by and large 
support the notion that states with branch banking 
were more stable than unit banking states (see 
Wheelock 1995; Mitchener 2004 for differences in 
the US and Grossman (1994) for international 
evidence).36 Moreover, also contemporary economists 
and financial journalists had long been stressing that 
unit banking was an important factor contributing to 
the United States extraordinary fragile banking 
system (Sprague 1903; Viner 1936).  
However, small unit banks that were not able to 
compete with larger urban branch banks, had long 
been supporting deposit insurance. The Great 
Depression and the resulting loss of confidence in the 
                                                          
36
 Somewhat surprising, studies based on intrastate data find 
that branch banks were more likely to fail than unit 
banks. Carlson & Mitchener (2005) resolve this puzzle by 
suggesting that branch banking led to increased 
competition. The result, according to the authors, was a 
stronger banking system (which is supported by 
interstate comparisons) without branch banks 
necessarily being the strongest banks (as suggested by 
intrastate data). Carlson & Mitchener (2009) confirm this 
finding by examining the Californian banking system as a 
pioneer of large-scale branch banking during the Great 
Depression. They find that small banks responded to 
entries of large branch banks by adjusting their 
operations and increasing their efficiency.   
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banking sector by the public provided the former with 
a strong public support for deposit insurance on a 
federal level. Calomiris & White (1994) argue that 
weak unit banks had long been in favour of deposit 
insurance but had lacked the political stamina to 
lobby against larger, urban branch banks which 
traditionally had opposed deposit insurance. The 
Great Depression, however, had caused a shift in 
public opinion which helped small banks to get the 
public behind the vested interest of unit banks and 
nation-wide deposit insurance: "Had there be no 
Great Depression, it seems unlikely that the United 
States would have adopted deposit insurance." 
(Calomiris & White 1994, p. 146)37 Consequently, 
federal deposit insurance was supported by members 
of Congress who saw deposit insurance as a “bulwark 
of the unit banking system” (Economides, Hubbard & 
Palia 1995, p. 22-23).  
Although there would have been other options 
that would have better addressed the banking 
problem, the legislature, by establishing the FDIC, 
chose to conserve the weak and overbanked system 
and thereby to reconfirm the system of unit banking. 
Williams (1935, p. 105) notes: 
„Having the kind of banking system that we do, 
it seems necessary also to have deposit insurance, 
though it would seem much more desirable to 
improve the banking system itself than merely to 
protect the depositor against its defects.”  
The Banking Act of 1933 thus reconfirmed the 
branching restriction the McFadden Act had 
established in 1927. Instead of allowing branching in 
order to address the banking system instability, 
federal deposit insurance was adopted, which 
attempted to address the unstable banking systems’ 
symptoms – banking failures – without pursuing the 
necessary financial reform to make the banking sector 
safer. Insofar as even the justification for deposit 
insurance derived from the hypothesis that illiquidity 
rather than solvency had caused the large number of 
bank failures turned out to be incorrect, Calomiris 
(2007, p. 1) notes: 
“Panics or ‘contagion’ played a small role in 
bank failure, during or before the Great Depression-
era distress. Ironically, the government safety net, 
which was designed to forestall the (overestimated) 
risks of contagion, seems to have become the primary 
source of systemic instability in banking in the 
current era.” 
 
 
                                                          
37
 Bradley (2000) views the introduction of federal deposit 
insurance before the background of the Great 
Depression even as “inevitable”. Flood (1992, p. 54-55) 
points out that in response to the Great Depression, a 
wide range of perceived solutions had been brought 
forward, including “relatively sober proposals […] to 
scrap the inefficient bureaucracies of representative 
democracy in favor of a fascist dictatorship or state 
socialism […]“ and installing a technocratic leadership. 
“Relative to alternatives such as these, federal deposit 
insurance […] was a remarkably moderate option.“  
3.3 The FDIC and Too-Big-to-Fail 
 
Federal deposit insurance had been viewed 
favourable by the public and many economists in the 
decades following the establishment of the FIDC 
when bank failures had been isolated and infrequent 
phenomena owing to an exceptionally stable 
macroeconomic setting. However, when the post-war 
boom and the associated rapid economic growth 
receded, bank failures re-emerged. From the 1970s 
onwards, the FDIC exhibited a strong bias in handling 
these bank failures by granting depositors and other 
creditors at large institutions full protection, while 
depositors at smaller institutions were only protected 
within the limits set by the law (FDIC 1984, p. 90-91; 
Sprague 2000). In “Bailout”, former FDIC board 
member Sprague (2000) recounts the most important 
bank failures during the initial stage of the bailout era 
(1970s and 1980s), emphasising the leading role the 
FDIC played in bailing out banks which were deemed 
too-big-to-fail. 
Finally, in 1984, the FDIC bailed out 
Continental Illinois – the seventh largest commercial 
bank at that time – by granting its creditors unlimited 
protection. At a congressional hearing on Continental 
Illinois, the Comptroller of the Currency finally 
confirmed what many observers had been fearing by 
stating that the eleven largest banks of the United 
States were too big to allow them to fail (Committee 
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 1984, p. 299-
300).  
Federal deposit insurance contributed in several 
ways to the development of TBTF. The attempt to 
preserve a dysfunctional banking system based on 
small, predominantly unit banks made the adaption of 
federal deposit insurance as a perceived remedy 
almost inevitable. As with prior bank obligation 
insurance schemes, the creation of the FDIC mainly is 
attributable to the attempt to preserve a weak, 
outdated system dominated by unit banks at the cost 
of a more resilient system based on branch banking. 
However, instead of stabilising the banking system, 
the federal safety net made the banking sector even 
more fragile and thereby set the pre-conditions for 
TBTF:  
(a) By not linking insurance premia to the risk 
characteristics of banks, federal deposit insurance 
provided risky banks with a de facto subsidy for risk-
taking. As deposit insurance decouples the probability 
of repayment of deposits from the solvency of banks, 
deposits were rendered insensitive to the risk level of 
banks, allowing risky banks to attract more deposits 
at lower rates than socially optimal (Kane 1989; 
Hellmann, Murdock & Stiglitz 2000). Various studies 
confirm that risky banks increase their reliance on 
insured, and hence less costly, deposits at the expense 
of non-insured deposits, whose costs responds more 
effectively to any given bank’s health.38 Hence, the 
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 For example, Billett, Garfinkel & O´Neal (1998) show that 
deposit insurance decreases market discipline and 
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deeply impaired market discipline resulting from 
deposit insurance allowed risky banks to become 
TBTF in the first place. Not only did deposit 
insurance encourage the development of the TBTF 
doctrine but cross-country evidence indicates that 
deposit insurance systems increase the propensity of 
financial and banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache 2000). Therefore, in addition to 
encouraging risky behaviour on the part of large 
banks, deposit insurance fostered an environment in 
which TBTF banks indeed require TBTF bailouts. 
(b) The inequitable approach to handling bank 
failures adopted by the FDIC by granting large bank 
creditors full protections in many cases, while 
creditors of small banks did not receive similarly 
favourable treatment, represents a major factor for the 
development of TBTF. The FDIC’s biased policy 
approach set in motion an autocatalytic process that 
fed upon itself and provided banks with a non-
technical incentive to grow in size in order to receive 
TBTF protection. 
(c) Related to point (b) above, once TBTF 
policies are established and as a corollary, TBTF 
institutions exist in numbers, the probability of 
bailing out uninsured creditors at large banks 
increases as large bank failures may threaten the 
solvency of the deposit insurance fund itself. Jones & 
Oshinky (2009) estimate that due to the merger 
activity of the 1990s (which, at least partly, had been 
motivated by the urge to achieve TBTF size) the 
probability of Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) insolvency 
tripled from 1.5% in 1990 to 4.5% in 2005. As “the 
health of the BIF has become inextricably tied to the 
health of the top-25 banking organizations and even 
more so the health of the top-10” (p. 84), a strong 
incentive for TBTF rescues has been introduced. As 
the authors further note, the probability of BIF 
insolvency may be substantially decreased – to 0.3% 
– if the top-10 institutions are not allowed to fail (p. 
84). Therefore, the necessity of preventing the deposit 
insurance fund from failing lends superficial 
justification to bailing out large financial institutions, 
ostensibly for society’s good.  
(d) Finally, Stern & Feldman (2009, p. 83) and 
Kovacevich (1996) point out that pre-funded deposit 
insurance systems increase the probability of TBTF 
bailouts by providing policy makers a source of funds 
that can easily be used to protect uninsured creditors. 
Therefore, the FDIC-administered Deposit Insurance 
Fund (DIF) provided the FDIC with an easily 
accessible source of funds that facilitated ad-hoc 
bailouts of large banks which were considered to be 
                                                                                       
shields banks from the full costs of risk-taking. The study 
provides evidence that banks increase the use of insured 
deposits following an increase in risk. Jordan (2000) 
documents that failing banks in New England improved 
the amount of insured deposits as uninsured depositors 
reacted to the deterioration of banks’ health by 
withdrawing deposits, implying that failing banks were 
allowed to postpone closure due to the availability of 
insured deposits are below-market rates.  
systematically too important to let them fail. As 
Kovacevich (1996) asks:  
“One wonders if the Barings Bank failure would 
have been treated as a systemic risk problem had it 
happened to a U.S. bank where regulators have easy 
access to `free´ funds to solve any problem. How 
would the Drexel, Burnham and Lambert insolvency 
have been handled if it had been a bank?” 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
This paper developed two points. First, the economic 
history of the United States’ past two hundred years 
indicates that financial sector regulation had, from c. 
1800 onwards for about 150 years, been dominated 
by policies that benefitted small banks at the cost of 
large branching banks. This approach resulted in a 
fragmented banking sector dominated by small unit 
banks and characterised by fragility. Ultimately, the 
collapse of the banking sector during the Great 
Depression resulted in federal deposit insurance 
which kept in place the dysfunctional banking 
system. Not only did federal deposit insurance not 
address the structural deficits of the banking system, 
it aggravated the danger emanating from banks by 
encouraging risk-taking. Deposit insurance allowed 
banks to maintain riskier balance sheets and grow 
faster than without the government safety net. 
Ultimately, the FDIC policy adopted regarding bank 
failures resulted in the development of the TBTF 
problem. Right from the beginning, FDIC policies 
exhibited a market tendency of bailing out creditors at 
large banks, while subjecting debtholders at smaller 
banks to the ordinary resolution process and thus to 
losses. The inequitable approach to handling banks 
failures of varying size, in turn, strongly incentivised 
banks to acquire TBTF size. It is not reading too 
much into history that in the light of the role the 
FDIC played in what would commonly be referred to 
as TBTF, the introduction of federal deposit 
insurance both precipitated and made possible TBTF. 
Detrimental to the intention of the public and policy-
makers in the 1933, the FDIC played a crucial role in 
destabilising the banking sector by encouraging 
inordinate risk-taking by banks.  
Second, history shows that a significant share of 
legislation and bank regulation can be explained by 
the economic theory of regulation. That is, regulation 
was supplied in response to the demand of 
concentrated interest groups at the expense of more 
dispersed groups which cannot lobby as effectively as 
the former. While early evidence supporting this 
notion is mainly anecdotal due to a lack of sufficient 
data, a wide range of bank regulation since the early 
1900s is explained by statistical evidence. However, 
the most profound regulatory changes can only be 
explicated by regulatory cognitive capture. In contrast 
to the pure concept of capture, regulatory cognitive 
capture allows interest groups to exploit pre-existing 
resentments, beliefs and ideology of large groups – 
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often the public – by offering a solution that 
seemingly is in the best interest for the public, while 
in fact it provides rents to special interest groups. 
Distrust and outright hostility of the public directed 
towards big “money centres” historically allowed 
small financial institutions to lobby successfully for 
beneficial regulation and legislation in many cases. 
Often such regulatory capture was augmented by the 
government’s own interests. Alternatively, capture of 
legislators by interest groups may function well when 
external shocks, for example crises, lead to an 
alignment of public and private interests. As Komai 
& Richardson (2011) show, a majority of financial 
crises have been followed by financial sector 
reformation. However, rarely have these reforms been 
successful in rendering the financial system more 
effective. Adoption of deposit insurance is merely 
one, although particularly disturbing, example for 
how politicians and the public have been captured by 
an industry’s vested interests which have led to non-
optimal regulation in the wake of financial crises.  
Woodward (1998, p. 18) notes: “Anyone who 
raises her voice as a cynical capture theorist is at 
heart an advocate for reform”. Although this paper 
developed a strictly positive explanation for 
regulation, it possesses some normative value. Given 
the deep impact of legislation directly following 
financial crises, it calls for reforming the financial 
systems in good times, when the merits of proposed 
changes introduced by special interest groups may be 
considered more objectively, appropriately and under 
less strain to act quickly. 
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